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RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER RULE lOb-5
I. Introduction
Rule lOb-51 is the most litigated provision of the federal securities laws.2
Since its informal beginnings in 1942,' the rule has become an important means
of enforcement for the broad anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.' Basically, the goal of the rule is to prevent persons with access to
information not generally known from exploiting less informed persons in secu-
rities transactions. The rule attempts to achieve this objective by requiring that
all parties to a securities transaction fully and completely disclose to one another
all material facts relevant to the transaction.'
A person who seeks redress under rule 10b-5 must bear in mind, however,
that the American legal system traditionally has denied a successful litigant an
award of attorneys' fees. This so-called "American Rule of attorneys' fees"'
basically holds that in the absence of contrary statutory authority, a litigant must,
with few exceptions,' bear the single greatest cost of asserting his legal rights-the
attorneys' fees-regardless of the outcome of the action.'
Although the American Rule applies to all varieties of litigation, it presents
a special problem for the successful 10b-5 litigant: in actions under rule 1Ob-5,
the attorneys' fees may well exceed the damages recovered.9 Thus, the net effect
of applying the American Rule to 1Ob-5 litigation is that the successful litigant
may win a legal victory but suffer a financial defeat.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2 Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant 10b-5 Developments, 7 SECURITIES L. REV. 403
(1975).
3 Then-SEC Staff Attorney Milton Freeman drafted the rule in response to a report that
he had received concerning a corporation president who was buying out his fellow share-
holders' stock by falsely telling them that the company was doing poorly. When the draft was
presented to the Commission, all of the commissioners read the rule and tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. No one said anything except Sumner Pike, who said, "Well, we are
against fraud aren't we?" Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22
Bus. LAW 893, 922 (1967).
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the 1934 Act.]
5 This is a broad statement of the purposes of rule lOb-5. The purposes of the rule will
be discussed more fully later in this note, but for an extensive treatment of the development
and purposes of rule lOb-5, see BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD--SEC RULE lob-5
(1971).
6 The American Rule of Attorneys' Fees hereinafter cited as the American Rule.
7 The traditional exceptions to the American Rule are the bad faith of a party, the
creation of a common benefit by the plaintiff, and the private attorney general theory. The
first two of these exceptions will be discussed at length later in this note.
8 MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 60 (1935).
9 See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the damages
awarded the plaintiffs totalled $38,875.00 and the amount of attorneys' fees was $47,808.42.
Id. at 594-95. The Straub case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 143-82 infra.
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This note suggests that this inequity should be remedied by expanding the
traditionally accepted and judicially fashioned "bad faith" and "common bene-
fit" exceptions to the American Rule to allow successful litigants in 10b-5 actions
to recover reasonable attorneys' fees unless special circumstances of the case would
render such an award unjust.1° To perceive fully the status of the present law
with regard to both the American Rule and rule 10b-5, however, it is first neces-
sary to examine the development of each with regard to its historical context and
underlying rationale.
II. Background and Development
A. Development of Rule lOb-5
The dominant congressional purposes behind passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were the promotion of free and open public securities
markets and the protection of the investing public from inequities in securities
trading.1 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was designed by Congress as a "catch-
all." It authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue rules
and regulations necessary to prevent fraudulent and deceptive devices and con-
trivances in securities transactions.' Section 10(b) was not intended to have a
narrow scope, but rather a broad, remedial interpretation. 3 Rule lOb-5, pro-
mulgated pursuant to this congressional authorization, makes unlawful any de-
ceptive or manipulative practice detrimental to the interests of investors. 4 The
rule does not specify particular practices that constitute fraud. Rather, it was
designed to encompass the "infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage
may be taken of investors and others."' 5
1. Expansion of Rule lOb-5
Neither rule 10b-5 nor § 10(b) of the 1934 Act expressly provides for
civil, liability, and therefore neither expressly defines nor delimits the scope of
relief available to private litigants who seek redress for damages allegedly caused
by violations thereof. Thus, actions under rule 10b-5 were originally brought
only by the SEC. The federal courts soon began to hold, however, that the rule
gave rise to private civil liability as well,'6 although it was not until 1971 that
10 This language is discussed in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968). See note 198 infra.
11 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968).
12 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1424 n.7 (2d ed. 1961).
13 Pitt, The Long Arm of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, FRAUD, INSaE INFOR-
MATION, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER RULE lOb-5, 64 (1976).
14 The rule was designed to prevent frauds not covered by § 17 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). § 17 requires a seller of securities to disclose material infor-
mation to Any buyer of his securities; it does not, however, require the buyer to make any
disclosure to his seller. Thus, prior to the promulgation of rule 10b-5 there was no statutory
liability imposed on a buyer for failure to disclose the same type of information that the seller
was required to disclose to the buyer. See Sargent, The Development of Rule 10b-5, EMERG-
ING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 1-6 (1961).
15 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
16 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), which involved a
seller of securities, was the first case to recognize a private action under rule lb-5. In Fisch-
man v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), a buyer of securities was held to
have a cause of action under rule lOb-5.
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the Supreme Court gave its official approval to private actions under rule 1 Ob-5."
In addition, the Supreme Court, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,'8 made it clear
that the federal courts should fashion liability to further the purposes of the
1934 Act. The Court stated:
[I]t is the duty of the courts to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the Congressional purpose. . . . [W]here legal rights have
been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done.19
The Court's policy statement has since been extended by the lower courts to rule
1Ob-5 violations.2"
Thus, as a result of the liberal predisposition of the federal courts to grant
relief under rule 1Ob-5, the rule quickly came to the forefront of federal securities
regulation. The early trend was clearly in the direction of expansion of liability
under rule 1Ob-5 as the use of the rule for private civil action increased. 2'
In an attempt to limit liability under the broad language of rule 1Ob-5 and
thereby slow the rate of expansion of private actions under the rule, courts have
applied the common law fraud doctrines of scienter, reliance, justifiable reliance,
and materiality as requirements for recovery," even though none of these quali-
fications are specifically required by it. In addition, the courts have required
that the plaintiff fall within the category of either "purchaser" or "seller" of
securities to claim protection under the rule." Application of these doctrines was
intended to provide a balance between extending greater protection to the
investing public and discouraging champerty4 and strike suits." Without gui-
17 Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
18 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The case involved a violation of federal proxy regulations and
was brought under § 14 of the 1934 Act.
19 Id. at 433.
20 See A. T. Bond & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Polakoff v. Delaware
Steeplechase & Race Ass'n., 254 F. Supp. 574 (D. Del. 1966).
21 For a discussion of the expansion of lOb-5 liability, see Soloman & Wilke, Securities
Professionals and Rule lOb-5: Legal Standards, Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines
and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORD. L. REV. 505 (1975).
22 Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's
Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S. CAR. L. REv. 653 (1975). The language of rule
lob-5 resembles the tort action of deceit. At common law, the elements of the action for
deceit are: 1) a false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this must
be a misrepresentation of fact;
2) knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false, or
that he does not have a sufficient basis of information to make it. This element is given the
technical name of "scienter;"
3) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon
the misrepresentation;
4) justifiable reliance upon the representation by the plaintiff; and
5) damage to the plaintiff as the result of his reliance. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 685 (4th ed. 1971).
23 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 343 U.S. 956
(1952). The now famous "Birnbaum Doctrine" specifically limits the private litigants who
may bring a 1Ob-5 action to individuals who have actually bought or sold the securities on
which the claim of fraud is based.
24 Champerty involves an agreement whereby a person without an interest in another's
law suit undertakes to carry it on at his own expense in consideration of receiving, if successful,
part of the proceeds of the litigation.
25 A strike suit is an action brought solely in the hope of winning a large attorneys' fee or
private settlement and without an intention of benefitting the corporation or class on behalf of
which the action was theoretically brought.
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dance from the Supreme Court, however, none of these requirements were uni-
formly applied in the lower courts, and the result was a continuing expansion in
the number of private civil actions brought under the rule.
Until recently,2" the Supreme Court allowed the lower courts to adopt what
can basically be termed a case-by-case approach to lOb-5 litigation. Notwith-
standing conflicts among the lower courts on the extent of liability under rule
lOb-5, the Supreme Court generally declined to intervene. Moreover, to the extent
certiorari was granted, there was no consistent pattern. Thus, the only general-
ization possible with regard to this early period of 10b-5 development is that the
securities laws, as remedial legislation, were to be construed flexibly and liberally.
The result of the Supreme Court's noninvolvement was a generally liberal ten-
dency to grant relief in the federal courts in 1Ob-5 cases.27
2. Contraction of Liability Under Rule 10b-5
Nearly everything that has been written during the expansionary period of
lOb-5 liability, however, will now have to be reconsidered in light of a new and
more restrictive trend of judicial interpretation evidenced by recent decisions of
the Supreme Court."' The Court has made it apparent that it intends to assume
a more active role in fashioning and limiting the development of the federal
securities laws in general and rule lOb-5 in particular.29 As a result of this new
trend, a lOb-5 litigant can expect to encounter greater difficulties in establishing
his case in court.' The result may well be an incurrence by the litigant of greater
attorneys' fees due to the heavier burden on the plaintiff and his attorney to
present evidence sufficient to sustain a cause of action within the newly con-
tracted sphere of 10b-5 liability. This would serve only to compound the prob-
lem that faces the potential 10b-5 litigant, who currently stands a good chance
of encountering a net financial loss even if successful in his 10b-5 suit."
B. Development of the American Rule
The ufiderlying reason for the existence of this inequitable situation is the
adherence by the federal courts to the American Rule on the award of attorneys'
fees. Legal commentators have in recent years expressed both amazement and
disappointment at the American system's continuing adherence to the Rule,
despite both its nearly unique status in the jurisprudential world" and the
26 Prior to the period of June 9, 1975 through March 30, 1976. See BLOOMENTHAL,
Introductory Survey, 8 SECURITMs L. Rv. xi, xii-xiv (1976).
27 Id. at xiii.
28 See text accompanying note 26 supra. During this period the Court decided Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), which involved the seller-purchaser
requirement under rule lOb-5, and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which
involved the requirement of scienter under the rule. These cases will be discussed more fully
later in this note.
29 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 26, at xii.
30 See notes 78-99 ifra.
31 See note 9 supra.




voluminous collected evidence of its inequities and shortcomings.3
1. Historical Justification
The American Rule of attorneys' fees directly contrasts with the English
Rule, which taxes all costs, including attorneys' fees, to the losing litigant. 4 In
early colonial America, most courts adopted the English Rule and awarded attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing litigant in actions at law. Subsequent statutes, how-
ever, limited these awards to specific maximum amounts. In addition, these
early courts and statutes did not adopt the theoretical goal of the English system-
to compensate fully the wronged party. As a result, the fees allowed by the early
courts and statutes were never increased to keep pace with the continual increases
in the cost of living. Furthermore, the new states that joined the Union rarely
provided for attorneys' fees to be taxed as costs and in no case made the award
adequate. Thus, the English practice of allowing fee awards to a prevailing
litigant, a clearly available option in colonial America, was rejected by the legal
establishment of the new United States.
3 5
There is disagreement concerning why the American states adopted a dif-
ferent rule. One suggestion is that the difference is due largely to an historical
accident. 6 This view suggests that because the awards fixed by statute were
unrealistically low, lawyers and courts gradually disregarded them. Another
explanation for the English Rule's rejection is that frontier settlers soon developed
attitudes of hostility and distrust towards legal practitioners." This distrust of the
American bar was fostered by a belief that the law was composed of simple rules
easily comprehensible by everyone and that a lawyer therefore was not necessary
to vindicate one's rights. Underlying both of these reasons, however, was the
frontier experience that engendered an individualistic spirit in the pioneers of
early America. 8 The popular view of the solitary pioneer dependent on his own
ability to achieve justice and preserve his rights played a substantial role in the
emergence of the unique American Rule.'
In 1796 the Supreme Court made its first ruling on attorneys' fees.4" The
Court held that the judiciary itself would not create a general rule, independent
of statute, that would allow awards of attorneys' fees in federal courts. Although
the Court admitted that its decision was not completely satisfactory, it rejected
33 See, e.g., Goodhart, Costs 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee:
Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963) ; Stoebuck. Counsel Fees Included
in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Ehrenzweig, Reimburse-
ment of Counsel'Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966) ; Note, Attorney's
Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967); Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
34 See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAD. L. REV.
1216 (1967).
35 See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247-68 (1975); Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636
(1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216 (1967).
36 See note 32 supra.
37 See note 35 supra.
38 See R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
39 Id.
40 Aracambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796).
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the inclusion of attorneys' fees as recoverable damages. The Court stated that
"[t]he general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if
that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of
the court."'" The Supreme Court has continued to adhere to that early holding."
2. Exceptions to the American Rule
Although the American Rule is now an established doctrine, it is not with-
out exceptions,43 and the Supreme Court has in recent years addressed these
exceptions in an attempt to clarify this confused and inconsistent area of the
law. Basically, the exceptions are grounded upon either statutory provisions that
permit the court to award attorneys' fees" or the court's inherent equity power. 5
a. Bad Faith
One major area in which the federal courts have exercised their equity
power to award attorneys' fees is in cases that involve bad faith by one of the
parties litigant."' Two aspects of the bad faith exception control its application-
the type of conduct involved and the timing of the bad faith in relation to the
litigation.
With regard to the type of wrongful conduct deemed sufficient to justify
application of the bad faith exception, the federal courts, as a result of the pre-
vailing American Rule, have been restrictive in their allowance of attorneys' fee
awards. Thus, there is no award except "in exceptional cases and for domi-
nating reasons of justice."4 " The Supreme Court, in F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial
Lumber Co.,4" allowed the use of the exception because the defendant had acted
"in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."4 In such cases,
the award of attorneys' fees is both punishment to the wrongdoer and just com-
pensation to the successful party who has been forced to expend funds unneces-
sarily.
The timing of the bad faith conduct has also been interpreted restrictively."
41 Id. at 306.
42 See, e.g., Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967);
Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872);
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 '(1852).
43 See note 7 supra.
44 See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33, at which the
statutes are compiled.
45 Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216
(1967) ; see also Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 240-41 (8th
Cir. 1928), where authorities are compiled.
46 For a discussion of the bad faith exception to the American Rule, see generally Com-
ment, 52 NoTRF DAMn LAW. 572 (1977).
47 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). See also Fleischman Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (overriding considerations of justice).
48 417 U.S. 116 (1973).
49 Id. at 129. See generally 6 MOORE, FE.DERAL PRACTICE, 54.77[21 (2d ed. 1972).
Courts have authorized the shifting of attorneys' fees when a party has acted wrongfully even
though his duties under the law were explicit, Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31
(1961); when he has put his opponent to unnecessary expense, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c); and
when he has caused unnecessary delay, harassment, or engaged in unfounded litigation, Annot.,
8 L. Ed. 894, 912-13 (1962).
50 See Universal Oil Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 388 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
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The general rule is that the wrongful acts must occur during the course of the
litigation itself.5 The Supreme Court indicated in Hall v. Cole,52 however, that
it may be appropriate to consider pre-litigation bad faith as a basis for an award
of fees. In this context, the Hall Court stated, "It is clear, however, that 'bad
faith' may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in
the conduct of the litigation."5 The lower federal courts have also allowed an
award of attorneys' fees based on pre-litigation bad faith. 4
b. Common Benefit
A second major area in which courts exercise their equity power to award
attorneys' fees is in cases that involve a common fund or benefit. The award in
these cases is theoretically made to avoid unjust enrichment of a class of potential
plaintiffs at the expense of an individual litigant who has protected or created
a fund or benefit in which all are entitled to share. The fee itself is thus paid
out of the common fund.
The Supreme Court expanded this judicially created exception to the
American Rule in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co."6 In Mills, shareholders of
Auto-Lite sued their company to set aside a merger on the grounds that the
management of the company had violated § 14(a) of the 1934 Act" and SEC
rule 14a-9"8 by the use of a false proxy statement. The Court ruled that the
proxy statement was indeed materially misleading and remanded to the district
court for consideration of the proper relief. The Court then turned its attention
to the plaintiffs' request for an interim award of attorneys' fees. Although all
that had been decided was the causation issue and no damages had as yet been
awarded or any monetary fund created, the Court ordered the defendant cor-
poration to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court
held that "fair and informed corporate sufferage" was a benefit produced by
the suit sufficient to justify the award of fees out of corporate assets where the
51 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 54.77[2] (2d ed. 1972).
52 412 U.S. 1 (1973). The case involved a consideration of the propriety of an award
of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff union member who had been expelled from his union
for introducing a set of resolutions which cited various instances of alleged short-sighted policies
on the part of union officers. His suit under section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970), vindicated his rights of free speech as well as the
interests of the union and its members. The Supreme Court discussed the "bad faith" rationale
with regard to the district court's denial of punitive damages and award of attorneys' fees.
Id. at 15. In addition, courts have awarded attorneys' fees simply on the ground that the party
has acted in bad faith, Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir.
1963).
53 Id. at 15. See also Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976), citing Hall v. Cole
in support of pre-litigation bad faith as sufficient to justify fee-shifting. In addition, the Court
in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), upheld assessment of attorneys' fees against
the losing party based on pre-litigation bad faith. Vaughan, however, was a case in admiralty,
which generally allows fee-shifting on a finding of bad faith. The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362 (1824).
54 See notes 154-55 infra.
55 The classic case espousing the traditional common fund rationale is Trustees v. Green-
ough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
56 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(a) (1970).
58 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970).
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benefit extended to all the shareholders.' The benefit, in the Court's view, was
the furtherance of the goals of the securities statute under which the suit was
brought.
The Mills exception to the American Rule is therefore more aptly described
as a "substantial benefit" rather than a "common fund." The Supreme Court
defended its endorsement of an expansion of the common benefit exception to
include an award of attorneys' fees even when no technical fund was created
as follows:
Nevertheless, the stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and
informed corporate sufferage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the
statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the cor-
poration and its shareholders.... [P]rivate stockholders' actions of this sort
'involve corporate therapeutics,' and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by
providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. 60
Thus, the "benefit" was essentially defined as the vindication of congressional
policy. The Supreme Court in Mills legitimized a stockholders' suit attorneys'
fee exception based solely on law enforcement policy considerations.6 The broad
language used by the Mills Court to justify its new standard was immediately
endorsed by the lower federal courts.62
3. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society
Five years after Mills was decided, the Supreme Court, in Alyeska Pipeline
Go. v. Wilderness Society,6" met the American Rule head-on in an effort to clarify
the availability of attorneys' fee awards to prevailing litigants in the federal
courts. Although the Court's decision was a significant step toward clarification,
it also restricted the use of such awards and thus abruptly curtailed the lower
courts' discretionary power to award attorneys' fees. The Alyeska Court dealt
with the American Rule in general terms, however, and did not specifically
address the Rule in relation to securities law litigation.
Alyeska involved an attempt by the Wilderness Society to prevent the
59 For a detailed discussion of the substantial benefit exception as elaborated by the Supreme
Court in Mills, see Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316 (1971).
60 396 U.S. at 396. The term "corporate therapeutics" derives from Hornstein, Legal
Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 658 (1956).
61 The actual holding of the Court on the issue of attorneys' fees is: "[P]etitioners, who
have established a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, should
be reimbursed by the corporation or its survivor for the costs of establishing the violation."
396 U.S. at 389-90. This holding was in response to the amicus curiae brief of the United
States, which had asserted that in cases that involve "corporate therapeutics" the absence of
express statutory authority should be no bar to an award of attorneys' fees. See note 59 supra.
In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the benefit approach used
in Mills. The Court found fee-shifting justified both as a way to enhance the protection of
statutory rights, id. at 13, and because the benefitted class would have had to pay for the
attorneys' fees had it brought the suit. Id. at 9. See generally Comment, 17 WAYNE L. Rav.
205 (1971).
62 See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950(1970), which extended to private actions under rule lab-5 the Supreme Court's broad endorse-
ment of attorneys' fees awards as a supplement to enforcement of the federal securities laws.
63 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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federal government from issuing the permits necessary for the construction of
the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The attempt failed, but the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that an award of attorneys' fees was appro-
priate under the private attorney general exception to the American Rule. The
private attorney general exception states that attorneys' fees may be recovered
by a prevailing plaintiff who has acted as a "private attorney general" in vindi-
cating important statutory rights of all citizens by bringing litigation which
effectuates strong congressional policy. The Supreme Court reversed the award
of attorneys' fees and thus halted reliance upon the private attorney general theory
as grounds for assessing attorneys' fees against the losing party of a lawsuit.
In Alyeska, the Court reviewed at length the history and development of
the American Rule.6" Based on its evaluation of congressional intent, statutory
provisions, and policy considerations, the Court determined that the plaintiff en-
vironmental organizations were not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under
the private attorney general doctrine.65 Although the Court dispensed with the
private attorney general theory, however, it left intact the traditional judicially
created exceptions of common benefit66 and bad faith.6" In discussing the con-
tinuing viability of these exceptions to the general rule, the Court stated, "These
exceptions are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow
attorneys' fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress."68 The
Court found that Congress had not repudiated these exceptions69 and that the
Court was therefore free to uphold them.
With regard to the bad faith exception, the Supreme Court in Alyeska again
indicated that pre-litigation bad faith"0 may justify an award of attorneys' fees.
The Court referred to F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co.' in dis-
cussing the requirements of the bad faith exception. An explanatory footnote
cites, in addition to the admiralty case of Vaughan v. Atkinson,"2 three circuit
court nonadmiralty cases in which attorneys' fees also were awarded for pre-
litigation bad faith."3 It seems, therefore, that the Vaughan standard concerning
pre-ligitation bad faith is not restricted to admiralty cases and remains intact
after Alyeska. By citing the Rich decision to demonstrate the existence and
64 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
65 In discussing the private attorney general theory, the Court was forced to consider the
effect of this exception on 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which expressly excludes an award of "the fees
and expenses of attorneys" in any civil action brought for or against the United States. Faced
with this express manifestation of congressional intent, the Court reasoned that federal courts
could not award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 2412, nor should the courts
"purport to adopt on their own initiative a rule awarding attorneys' fees based on the private-
attorney-general approach when such judicial rule will operate only against private parties and
not against the government." 421 U.S. at 269.
66 421 U.S. at 257-58. The Court cited, inter alia, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., in
support of the common benefit exception.
67 The Court stated that an award was justified when a losing party acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 421 U.S. at 258-59.
68 Id. at 259 (emphasis supplied).
69 Id. at 269.
70 See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
71 417 U.S. 116 (1973).
72 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
73 McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971); Bell v. School Bd. of Pow-
hatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d
473 (4th Cir. 1951).
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limitations of the. bad faith exception, the Supreme Court in Alyeska implicitly
incorporated within that exception the Rich decision's endorsement of Vaughan
and the other pre-litigation bad faith cases. Thus, pre-litigation bad faith may
be held sufficient to allow an award of attorneys' fees."4
Ultimately, then, the Supreme Court did in fact uphold the American Rule
in the Alyeska case, but its endorsement was moderate at best. In the
concluding paragraph of the majority opinion, the Court commented that it was
not assessing the merits of the American Rule; rather, the Court stated that not-
withstanding that private action to implement public policy is desirable in various
circumstances, the Rule had survived."
C. The Supreme Court and Rule 10b-5
1. Blue Chip Stamps u. Manor Drug Stores
The predisposition of the Supreme Court toward restrictive interpretation
of liability under rule 1Ob-5 was not limited to consideration of attorneys' fees
awards. Less than a month76 after Alyeska, the Supreme Court reached another
trend-setting decision. In this instance it was the trend of generally expanding
liability under rule lOb-5 that was evaluated by the Court.7 That trend seemed
to come to an abrupt halt in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,"8 in which
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the relatively restrictive standing requirement"
espoused in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.8" This standing requirement, which
had fallen victim in some circuits to the general trend toward liberalization,"- was
given an official blessing by the Blue Chip Stamps Court.
The case involved a reorganization and a merger of the Blue Chip Stamps
Co. ("Old Blue Chip") into a new corporation ("New Blue Chip") as the
74 See also Skehas v. Bd. of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 57-8 (3d Cir. 1976), for a discussion
of pre-litigation bad faith in light of Alyeska. The case involved an untenured teacher who
brought a civil rights suit against a state college. The Third Circuit held that the teacher
was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under the private attorney general theory.
The court remanded the case to the district court, however, for a determination of whether
attorneys' fees should be taxed against the college on the basis of obduracy in maintaining
a defense to the teacher's suit. The obduracy issue had not been previously considered by
the district court.
75 421 U.S. at 270-71. The Court stated:
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the "American Rule".
It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have been urged to find exceptions
to it. It is also apparent from our national experience that the encouragement of
private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety of
circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees
has survived.
The Court went on to intimate that it was the sweeping potential of the private attorney
general theory to engulf the general Rule completely that was objectionable in this case. It
concluded its opinion by stating, "It is not for us to invade the legislature's province by redis-
tributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by the respondents and followed by the
Court of Appeals." Id. at 271.
76 Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society was decided on May 12, 1975; Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores was decided on June 9, 1975.
77 See text accompanying notes 12-27 supra.
78 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
79 See note 23 sspra.
80 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
81 See Note, Standing to Sue in lOb-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on the
Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 1131 (1974).
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result of a civil antitrust action brought by the United States against Old Blue
Chip, a corporation engaged in the business of providing trading stamps to re-
tailers. Under the merger plan, New Blue Chip was required to offer a substantial
number of its shares of common stock to retailers who had used the stamp service
in the past but who had not been shareholders in Old Blue Chip. Two years
after the reorganization and merger, the plaintiff retailer, an original offeree,
brought an action in which he alleged that the defendant New Blue Chip had
violated rule 1Ob-5 by offering a prospectus that constituted an intentionally
overly pessimistic appraisal of New Blue Chip's status and future prospects. The
plaintiff further alleged that this had been done to discourage him from accepting
what turned out to be a bargain offer in order that New Blue Chip could later
sell the shares to the public at an inflated price. The plaintiff alleged that as a
result of these statements, he had declined to purchase any of the shares. The
Court held that because he was not an actual buyer or seller of securities, but
merely an offeree, the plaintiff did not have standing to assert a 1 Ob-5 violation.
This decision was a first step by the Court toward curbing the growth of rule
10b-5, which the Court described as the "judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn."8 2
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court discussed the factors it considered important
in its decision to depart from its previously held position that rule 1Ob-5 should
be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its re-
medial purposes." 3 The Court determined that litigation under rule 1Ob-5
"presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general."8 4 The Birnbaum purchaser-seller doc-
trine, it concluded, helps to lessen the danger of strike suits by those who have
never been involved at all in the corporation. 5 According to the Court, "[T]he
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the
law will ultimately result in more harm than good."8 6 Thus, in the Court's view,
a restrictive standing requirement was justified.
To emphasize its new approach to rule 10b-5, the Court stated further:
"[W]e are not dealing here with any private right created by the express language
of § 10(b) or of Rule lOb-5.... We are dealing with a private cause of action
which has been judicially found to exist, and which will have to be judicially
delimited."8 " The Court thus greatly restricted the class of persons who would
be allowed to assert a violation of Securities rule 10b-5.
82 421 U.S. at 737.
83 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
84 421 U.S. at 739.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 747-48. In support of its position, the Court cited Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
174 N.E. 441 (1931), in which Chief Judge Cardozo espoused the dangers with respect to
"a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
174 N.E. at 444. The case involved an action for damages by a third party investor who
had relied on an inaccurate balance sheet prepared and certified as correct by the defendant
accountants. The court held that the public accountants were not liable for negligence to
creditors and investors to whom their employer showed the certificate, but that they would be
liable to such third parties for intentional or reckless misrepresentations.
87 421 U.S. at 748-49.
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2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
Less than a year later,88 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,89 the Supreme Court
again had occasion to consider liability under rule lOb-5, this time in relation
to the requirement of scienter necessary to sustain a cause of action. The case
involved customers of a brokerage firm who invested in a fraudulent securities
scheme. The customers brought an action against the defendant accounting firm
which had undertaken an audit of the brokerage firm's books. The claim, based
on a theory of negligent nonfeasance, was that the defendant had failed to
utilize appropriate auditing procedures and had thereby failed to discover the
fraudulent scheme. The holding of Hochfelder was as succinct as it was signifi-
cant: "We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private cause of
action for damages will lie under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the absence
of any allegation of "scienter"-intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud....
We conclude that it will not."91
Scienter refers to an "intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey a false impres-
sion ... [Such] intent must be a matter of belief, or absence of belief, that the
representation is true." 92 Although the word scienter is not included in the lan-
guage of rule lOb-5, the courts have held that a requirement of scienter follows
from the similarity of 1 Ob-5 to common law fraud." A controversy arose in the
lower courts, however, with regard to whether negligence was sufficiently wrong-
ful conduct to constitute a violation of the rule.94 The Hochfelder decision settled
this conflict with its definitive holding that a lOb-5 action must be based on
some element of scienter and cannot be based on negligent conduct alone.9" As
in Blue Chip Stamps,"8 the Court relied on the wording and legislative intent of
the statute to support its holding. According to the Court, "The words 'manip-
ulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly
suggest that section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct."9' In addition, the Court found that when rule lOb-5 was adopted,
"it was intended to apply only to activities that involved scienter."' 8
Thus, once again the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling was to restrict
the class of potential plaintiffs who would be allowed protection under rule lOb-5.
It is apparent that the Court felt the same concerns about the problem of scienter
that it did about the question of standing in Blue Chip Stamps. Citing the major-
ity opinion in Blue Chip Stamps, the Hochfelder Court reiterated that broadening
the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law would result in more
harm than good.9 Based on the holdings and rationale of these two cases, it
88 The case was decided on March 30, 1976.
89 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
90 See note 22 supra.
91 425 U.S. at 193.
92 PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 700 (4th ed. 1971).
93 See note 22 supra.
94 For a discussion of the scienter element in a 10b-5 violation, see Note, Scienter's Scope
and Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 925 (1977).
95 425 U.S. at 201.
96 See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra.
97 425 U.S. at 197.
98 Id. at 212.
99 Id. at 214 n.33, citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 747.
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seems clear that the intent of the Supreme Court is to bring under control the
expansion of 10b-5 liability that had taken place on a case-by-case basis in the
lower courts since the rule was promulgated in 1942. This restriction on liability
has the desired effect of foreclosing non-meritorious 1Ob-5 litigation, and this
result supports the view that the American Rule justifiably can be relaxed with
regard to suits under rule lOb-5."'0
III. Practical Justifications for the American Rule:
Its Effect on Litigation
In light of the present state of the law with regard to both the American
Rule and rule 1Ob-5 litigation requirements, changes should be made to alleviate
the current situation in which a plaintiff with a meritorious cause of action may
have to lose money in order to uphold his legal rights in court. In this regard, an
expansion of the traditional bad faith and common benefit exceptions to the
American Rule would be consistent with judicial precedent and would allow for
a more just result to the litigation.1"'
The arguments in favor of adherence to the American Rule are familiar
ones."0 2 It has been argued that legal fees are too remote from the defendant's
wrongful conduct. 3 and that a proper fee could not be accurately determined by
the court. 4 It has also been contended that without the American Rule attor-
neys would charge exorbitant fees and that litigants would be discouraged from
bringing suit for fear of having to pay two sets of costs upon losing. With regard
to securities fraud specifically, it has been suggested that absence of the American
Rule could encourage strike suits or champerty"' None of these arguments,
however, justifies the basic inequities of the Rule. As one commentator has
suggested, the Supreme Court
"adopted a rule first announced in 1796 by a Court which admitted the
possible unsoundness of its own position. While justifications have concededly
been offered in its continued support over the years, the courts have tended
to rely heavily on early cases as compelling and authoritative support for the
rule, without ever examining frontally its essential underpinnings. 0 6
Although these justifications have sustained the presence of the Rule in the
American judicial system, each of them can be rebutted.
A. Non-Meritorious Litigation
The Supreme Court has, in essence, already eliminated the problem of
100 See text accompanying notes 107-09 infra.
101 Id.
102 For a discussion of the policy justifications for the American Rule, see generally Ehren-
zweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966);
Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967);
McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services,
40 FORD. L. REV. 761 (1972).
103 Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878).
104 Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
105 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
106 Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
TJ. PA. L. REV. 636, 644 (1974).
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champerty and other non-meritorious litigation with regard to lOb-5 causes of
action. Through its rationale and holdings in Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder,
the Court has effectively limited the class of persons who can prevail in a lOb-5
suit to those who are both directly involved in the transaction" 7 and who are
able to prove scienter on the part of the defendant.' The restrictive standing
requirement of Blue Chip Stamps makes certain that the only lOb-5 plaintiffs
will be those who have made an actual purchase or sale of securities, and the
scienter requirement of Hochfelder provides that the defendant will not be held
liable unless the plaintiff can prove willful or intentional misconduct. These two
requirements reinforce each other to produce the net effect of allowing only
plaintiffs with meritorious claims to prevail."° In light of the difficult standards
the plaintiff must now meet, a defendant will not easily be pressured into
accepting a settlement for fear of losing a long battle in court. Thus, because of
the Supreme Court's new lOb-5 requirements, champertous claims, as well as
so-called "nuisance" suits based on mere technical violations of the law, can no
longer pass Supreme Court muster.
B. Foreseeability of the Award
Similarly, the argument based on the postulated remoteness of damages is
easily rebutted. Authorities have uniformly suggested that in today's complex
legal system, which necessitates the intervention of an attorney, legal fees may be
foreseen as a direct result of the wrong committed." 0 Arguably this suggestion is
even more applicable in the technical area of securities fraud litigation. Because
of the technicalities and complexity involved in the highly regulated field of
securities transactions, a plaintiff of necessity must be represented by an attorney
who possesses the requisite specialized knowledge of securities law. The indispensa-
bility of legal representation makes attorneys' fees in lOb-5 litigation more fore-
seeable than fees in other types of litigation in which a plaintiff may well be able
to prevail with pro se representation.
C. Calculation of the Award
The "problem" of fee calculation has also been considered a major reason
to retain the American Rule."' The Supreme Court has suggested that if courts
had discretion to determine the amount of the award, a special master might have
to be appointed to make the determination, which would render the original
litigation more complex and expensive." 2 These fears carry little weight today."3
There currently exist a significant number of federal statutes which grant courts
the power to award attorneys' fees." 4 There is no indication that the courts have
107 See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra.
108 See text accompanying notes 88-99 supra.
109 See generally Allen, Rule 10b-5 and the Burger Court-Time to Reexamine the Elements
for a IOb-5 Action, 82 COMMERCIAL L.J. 118 (1977).
110 McCoRMIcx, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 71 at 257 (1935).
111 For a discussion of methods of attorneys' fees calculation, see Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 636 (1974).
112 Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872).
113 See Comment, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699(1940).
114 See note 44 supra.
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been unable to determine adequate and fair awards or that the process has
involved excessive delay or complexity. Particularly in equity cases, in which
judicial discretion is the norm, judges are familiar with this type of evaluative
determination.
The fees, if awarded, should be "reasonable,"".15 and there are accepted
guidelines that courts may use to determine the size of the award."' Not only
should the "skill and experience"" 7 of the lawyer be taken into consideration, but
also the amount of time "reasonably expended on a matter.""' Also relevant are
all other circumstances that surround the case, including its importance and the
result reached." 9 Specifically with regard to "benefit" cases in which there is no
monetary recovery, the value of the judgment to the class benefitted must also be
considered."' In sum, any factor that is pertinent to the result and equitable to
both the attorney and the parties may be considered."' "Such an allowance rests
within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will be interfered with by an
appellate court only when it is convinced that it is clearly excessive or insuffi-
cient."'
122
Although a detailed discussion of the mechanics and the frequency of fee-
shifting is beyond the scope of this note,"' enough illustrations have been given
to make the point salient to this discussion: the allowance of substantial attorneys'
fees is hardly a rarity in the law. The cases in which fee-shifting is allowed
115 Id. These statutes do not fix a specific fee schedule; rather, Congress has given statutory
authorization for awarding "reasonable" attorneys' fees.
116 There is an extensive discussion of the factors to be taken into account in awarding
attorneys' fees in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
The court cited the following factors: 1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill required, (4) the preclusion of other employment, (5)
the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations, (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and skill of the
attorney, (10) the "undesirability" of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. See also Kerr v. Screen Extras
Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). See generally 6
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 54.77[2] (1976).
117 Adair Lumber Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 19 F. Supp. 415, 417
(W.D. Mo. 1937).
118 See note 202 infra.
119 See Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Southeast Arkansas Levee Dist., 106
F.2d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 1939), in which an award of attorneys' fees for services rendered in
receivership and bankruptcy proceedings was increased from $1,000 to $5,000 in connection
with litigation in which "numerous conferences were necessary to reconcile conflicting interests.
Hearings were held and the appearances and preparation of briefs entailed the expenditure of
time and labor. These hearings were bitterly contested . . . and the efforts of counsel for the
trustees were met with energetic opposition." Id. at 972.
120 See Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1975).
121 See Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), in which
a distinction is drawn between cases that involve protection of a benefit, in which attorneys'
fees come from the group benefitted, and cases in which fees are awarded against the defen-
dant. The court found that in either case, attention should be on the reasonable hourly rate
of compensation and the number of hours expended by counsel. The court may then deviate
from this figure according to the level of counsel's performance or the likelihood of failure at
the start. In the action in which fees are awarded against the defendant, however, the court
held that any contingent fee arrangements between the plaintiff and his counsel cannot be
considered because this might lead to unrealistic agreements and result in excessive counsel
fees. The court also stated that if a reasonable fee as determined by the court does not fully
satisfy a contingent fee agreement, the excess should be taken out of the damage award. See
also Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
122 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[2] at 1716.
123 See generally Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1216 (1974).
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comprise a substantial proportion of American litigation; in the vast majority of
these, the sole statutory or decisional measure of the award is that it shall be
"reasonable." '124 Thus, a more liberal allowance of fee-shifting would create no
new or drastic problems; rather, American judges would merely perform more
frequently a function that they already perform. The difference would be one
of degree and not of kind.
These rebuttals to the alleged justifications for the American Rule illustrate
that the Rule itself no longer rests on a solid foundation in American law. 2 '
In light of this fact, its resultant inequity in 1Ob-5 litigation is even less acceptable.
IV. Bases for Reform
Because of the complexity of modem securities regulations and public securi-
ties markets, a plaintiff with a small or moderate claim in technical and lengthy
securities fraud litigation may well be forced to spend considerably more money
on the costs involved in litigating (principally because of attorneys' fees) than he
is able to recover by way of provable losses due to the fraud. Understandably,
this leads to reluctance of the "little man" to seek judicial vindication of his legal
rights.
A. Present Responses to the Problem
The present legal system's dual response to this dilemma consists of the
contingent fee device and the legal aid office. Unfortunately, both are inadequate
to the task. The former will simply not operate where the anticipated award is not
large, whereas the latter suffers from a dearth of offices and qualified attorneys
able and willing to handle this type of work.126 This situation is considerably
aggravated in 10b-5 litigation, the preparation of which may necessitate an
atypical amount of time and effort on the part of an attorney. In these circum-
stances, the court's award of attorney's fees may offer the "sole stimulus" for
bringing a 1 Ob-5 action and therefore the "sole stimulus" for the private enforce-
ment of the securities laws.2
27
A fundamental ideal of the common law is to make the wronged person
whole, at least to the extent that this result can be accomplished by an award of
money. This ideal, however, is not only frustrated, but undermined in the
inequitable situation in which a prevailing party in a 10b-5 action wins a legal
victory but suffers a financial defeat because he cannot recover the attorneys' fees
incurred in vindicating his legal rights. Moreover, the inequity does not operate
against the plaintiff alone; the defendant may suffer as well. The cost of defend-
ing against an unjust small or moderate claim may well be greater than the cost
of simply paying what has been demanded.
124 See notes 114-15 supra.
125 See note 106 supra.
126 Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 381(1965); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAmiF. L.
REv. 792 (1966).
127 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751(1943). In this case, which involved a violation of § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, the court awarded
attorneys' fees on the "sole stimulus of enforcement" theory.
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For the reasons stated above, it is contended that a relaxation of the Ameri-
can Rule in lOb-5 litigation is necessary, justifiable, and workable within the
American system of justice.' The mechanism for achieving a relaxation of the
Rule is likewise available without creating a major disruption in judicial adminis-
tration. The bases have traditionally been recognized by the courts;"' they merely
require expansion to achieve the desired result.
B. Expansion of the Bad Faith Exception
Expansion of the bad faith exception to the American Rule has the advan-
tage of focusing directly on the elimination of wrongful conduct, 3 ' because under
this exception the litigant must have demonstrated bad faith actions before
attorneys' fees will be assessed against him. It therefore seems particularly well-
suited to post-Hochfelder litigation under rule 10b-5."' By expanding the bad
faith exception to allow for pre-litigation bad faith as a general rule, the successful
plaintiff would almost automatically be awarded attorneys' fees since, under the
Hochfelder ruling, he must first prove intentional or knowing wrongful conduct
on the part of the defendant before he is able to recover any damages at all.
This wilful intent to defraud certainly meets the "wanton, vexatious" standard
endorsed by the Supreme Court.' Because there is already case support for
allowing pre-litigation bad faith to qualify as grounds for an award of attorneys'
fees"3 this expansion would not be the "drastic" departure from the American
Rule that concerned the Alyeska Court."4
Even if it is not possible to use pre-litigation bad faith as a basis for the
award, the plaintiff should still be able to recover fees in 10b-5 litigation. The
defendant's conduct comes within the bad faith exception to the American Rule
if one defines the defendant's proven scienter as tantamount to litigious bad faith.
The argument would be as follows: the defendant must be guilty of knowing
wrongful conduct for the plaintiff to recover under Hochfelder; thus if the plain-
tiff does recover, the contumacious defendant's defense of this intentionally
wrongful conduct is, absent exceptional circumstances, "in bad faith or for
128 For a discussion of the need for relaxation of the American Rule and a proposed
statute to implement the change, see Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logi-al
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966). Professor Stoebuck favors a system that
routinely shifts fees except when an action turns upon a question of law not previously decided.
129 See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
130 See generally Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
131 See notes 88-99 supra.
132 See note 49 supra. This result is consistent with a similar standard set by Congress in
the area of civil rights legislation. In § 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No.
92-318, 86 Stat. 369 (1972), Congress enacted a liberal standard that allows successful plain-
tiffs to recover attorneys' fees simply because they were forced to go to court to vindicate their
rights. Specifically, the Act provides that a court may award the prevailing party a reasonable
attorneys' fee as part of the costs "upon a finding that the civil rights proceedings were neces-
sary to bring about compliance." Id. Under prior law in school desegregation cases, plaintiffs
were required to demonstrate that the defendant school board acted in an unreasonable and
obdurately obstinate manner. See Herry v. Clarksdae Municipal Separate School Dist., 480
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1973).
133 See note 73 supra.
134 421 U.S. at 269. The Court held that courts were "not free to fashion drastic new
rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees." Id.
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oppressive reasons."' 35 Therefore, because he has conducted litigation in bad
faith, the defendant comes within the present generally accepted definition of
the bad faith exception, which states that the bad faith must occur during the
course of the litigation itself.13
Thus, in the context of 10b-5 litigation, where the plaintiff's clearly estab-
lished legal right not to be defrauded has been intentionally abused by the defen-
dant so that judicial proceedings are needed to vindicate that right, the plaintiff
should be awarded attorneys' fees. It is unfair to cause the burden of the litigation
costs to fall on the party who would have freely enjoyed his legal rights but for
the knowing wrongful conduct of his opponent.
There would, of course, be situations in which an award of attorneys' fees
would be unfair, but in these special circumstances the courts would have dis-
cretion not to allow the award.3 ' If the defendant had a "reasonable ground
to believe he might prevail on the matter"'3 8 or if there was "other good reason"' 3
for him to defend his conduct and thus cause full judicial proceedings to be
brought, he would not be assessed the plaintiff's attorneys' fees.
Under the judicial constraints imposed upon rule 10b-5 causes of action,
however, the defendant generally would not be able to escape such an assessment
of fees. The defendant's proven knowing wrongful conduct would create a strong
presumption that he did not have a "reasonable ground to believe that he might
prevail" in the defense of his conduct. Thus, unless there are "special circum-
stances that would render such an award unjust,"'40 the plaintiff should recover
attorneys' fees because he has been deprived of his legal rights by the bad faith
of the defendant and, in addition, because he must resort to the courts to vin-
dicate those rights. The defendant who in bad faith chooses to defend conduct
which he does not have reasonable grounds to believe can be successfully de-
fended, merely in the hope that the plaintiff will tire of the fight and either with-
draw completely or settle his claim for a lesser amount, should be assessed the
plaintiff's fees.
Similarly, when a plaintiff is shown to have brought a suit in bad faith, the
defendant would be allowed to recover reasonable attorneys' fees. Thus, the
pressure on the defendant to settle a claim he knows to be unfounded would be
eliminated.' 4 1 The fact that a defendant may also be allowed to collect attorneys'
fees should not deter plaintiffs from bringing meritorious suits under rule lOb-5
when those suits have only a "borderline" chance of being successful. In such
cases, fees would not be assessed against the plaintiff. It is only in the event that
the plaintiff's suit was clearly unfounded and therefore brought in bad faith that
135 See note 49 supra.
136 See note 51 supra.
137 See Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
138 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) (3). The rule applies specifically to a party's failure to make
discovery, but the standards enunciated by the rule arguably should apply to a party's conduct
in lob-5 litigation.
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(4).
140 See note 198 infra.
141 See note 128 supra. Professor Stoebuck's system provides that when the prevailing
party is adjudged to have brought or defended an action in bad faith, obstinately refused to
settle, or otherwise abused the legal apparatus, the judge has the discretion to dismiss or
eliminate the award of attorneys' fees to that party. 38 U. CoLO. L. REv. 202, 214 (1966).
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he would be penalized. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff is unsuccessful in the
litigation would not render him liable for his opponent's attorneys' fees. If his
claim is brought in good faith, the losing claimant would pay only his own
counsel fees."4 2
This reasoning is not so much an expansion of the concept of the bad faith
exception as it is a recognition of the higher degree of wrongful conduct and proof
of that conduct that the Supreme Court now requires under rule lOb-5.
1. Straub v. Vaisman & Co.
In Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
had an opportunity to expand the bad faith exception in the manner described
above but declined to do so. The case involved foreign nationals who purchased
stock in an American corporation on the strength of fraudulent recommendations
by an American securities broker who stood in a position of trust with regard
to the defrauded plaintiffs. The District Court for the District of New Jersey
entered judgement for the plaintiffs and awarded attorneys' fees because it found
the defendant's conduct "reprehensible."'"
In an opinion announced less than three months after Hochfelder,"' the
Third Circuit decided that only bad faith that occurs during the course of the
litigation justifies an award of attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception. The
court did not dwell on this issue, however, because its holding was of a more
limited nature.
The Straub court concluded that § 28(a)'.. of the 1934 Act prohibited
an award of attorneys' fees because that section limits recovery under the Act
in general, and therefore under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, to "actual damages."
Since the term "actual damages" is not defined anywhere in the Act, however,
there is no explicit congressional prohibition against an award of attorneys' fees
under this provision, as other circuits have noted. 4 Therefore, in light of the
underlying purpose of the 1934 Act-the prevention of fraud-an equally valid
interpretation of "actual damages" includes attorneys' fees. When the cost of
counsel is paid out of the damage award, the plaintiff himself does not recover
all of his proven actual damages. He recovers only so much of the damages as
may remain after he has paid this necessary litigation expense.
In 10b-5 litigation, the plaintiff who must pay his own attorney's fees may
actually recover little or nothing, or he may be left with a net loss. He will never
142 See notes 200-01 infra.
143 540 F.2d 591 (1976).
144 Id. at 595.
145 Straub was decided on June 15, 1976; Hochfelder was decided on March 30, 1976.
146 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). The section provides:
(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall
recover, through satisfaction of judgement in one or more actions, a total amount
in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
147 See Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920,
reh. denied, 414 U.S. 882 (1973), and Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972),
which hold that a plaintiff may recover compensatory as well as punitive damages where
common law fraud is proved in addition to violations of the federal securities laws.
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recover the full amount of the "actual damages on account of the act complained
of"'4 8 that he is authorized to recover under the 1934 Act. An interpretation
of § 28(a) that supports the award of attorneys' fees thus seems consistent with
the language of the statute as well as its spirit and purpose.
The Third Circuit in Straub also interpreted the Hochfelder mandate to
require that the courts apply each section of the 1934 Act with precision. 49 It
thus determined that the power of the courts to award attorneys' fees in § 10(b)
litigation is "sharply circumscribed."' 50 Therefore, the court concluded that it
could not award attorneys' fees unless the applicable section specifically authorized
an award.' The court also determined that the bad faith exception itself could
apply only to conduct that occurred during the course of the litigation.'52 Thus,
the court held, "Since we have concluded that the [1934 Act] precludes an
allowance because of bad faith inherent in the cause of action itself, we need
concern ourselves here only with conduct which occurred [after the litigation
commenced]."'5 3 The court acknowledged, but declined to review or discuss,
a line of cases in which attorneys' fees were awarded on the basis of bad faith
that occurred before litigation actually commenced 5. or in which bad faith
formed the basis of the suit itself. 55
A strong dissenting opinion, however, argued that the award of attorneys'
fees made by the district court could be upheld. 50 The dissent first discussed the
wilfully fraudulent intent of the defendant and concurred with the finding of the
district court that his conduct was "willful, wanton, and reprehensible."'' The
dissent then cited Hall v. Cole.. as an endorsement by the Supreme Court that
bad faith sufficient to justify an award of attorneys' fees can be found in actions
that occur before, as well as during, the course of the litigation.'
148 See note 146 supra.
149 540 F.2d at 599.
150 Id. See note 163 infra.
151 540 F.2d at 599.
152 Id. at 600.
153 Id.
154 Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th
Cir. 1974); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd summarily, 409 U.S. 942
(1972).
155 Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Schein v. Smith,
160 F.2d 22 (1947).
156 540 F.2d at 600-01.
157 Id. at 595, 601.
158 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
159 540 F.2d at 601. The dissent also maintained that this principle was reaffirmed by the
language of the Supreme Court in F. D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974) ; and in Alyeska Pipeline Co. *v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
Id. See Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. Ky. 1976), which cites Hall as an
endorsement of the award of attorneys' fees based on bad faith that occurs either in the
actions that led to the law suit or in the conduct of the litigation itself. The Lamb court
found no indication that there had been bad faith in the course of the litigation, but
awarded the plaintiff attorneys' fees based on the pre-litigation "obdurate obstinacy" of
the defendant. See also Havecker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (1976), which
cites Hall v. Cole as support for an award of attorneys' fees based on the bad faith of
the defendant and states in footnote to its citatin of Hall that "[t]he 'bad faith' which
justifies the award of attorneys' fees may be demonstrated in the conduct which necessitated the
action or in conduct occurring during the course of the action. Hall v. Cole, . . .412 U.S. at
15.. . . Bad faith may be demonstrated by showing that a defendant's obstinacy in granting
a plaintiff his clear legal rights necessitated resort to legal action with all the expense and
delay entailed in litigation. . .. In this regard, the purpose of an award of attorneys' fees
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In addition, since the plaintiff's attorneys' fees exceeded the amount of the
recoverable damages,"' ° the decision of the majority in finding for the plaintiff
but not allowing the fees to be shifted was a hollow "victory" indeed. Thus, be-
cause of the defendant's bad faith in this action, an interest in rendering a
fair and equitable result justified the exercise of the court's discretion to award
attorneys' fees.
It appears that the majority opinion in Straub may have been the result
of an overly narrow reading of both the 1934 Act and the Alyeska and Hoch-
felder decisions, for the court's holding is not the only one justified by legal
precedent. Had it chosen to do so, the Third Circuit might well have upheld
an award of attorneys' fees in Straub. The justification for such an award can
be found in the very precedents cited by the court.
Although the Supreme Court in Alyeska approved the American Rule, it
specifically upheld the bad faith exception to that Rule. 1 ' It also specifically
declined to comment on the wisdom of the Rule and concluded only that it was
still a part of the American legal system.' 62 In Hochelder, fee-shifting was not
even an issue; the Supreme Court in a footnote merely noted without elaboration
the existence of the bad faith exception in 10b-5 cases.'" 3 The majority in Straub
interpreted the Supreme Court's Hochelder footnote to mean that the bad faith
exception is still viable in 1Ob-5 litigation."' The dissenting opinion cited the
same footnote for the proposition that a district court has the power to award
attorneys' fees in 1Ob-5 cases in which bad faith is present. 6  The Straub court,
however, without further discussion, summarily concluded that "[g]enerally, an
allowance because of bad faith is based on conduct which occurs during the
course of the litigation,' 6. and in conjunction with its restrictive reading of the
1934 Act, the court reversed the plaintiff's fees award.
With regard to the 1934 Act, the Straub court, after limited discussion,
concluded that attorneys' fees could not be awarded absent a specific authoriza-
tion in the applicable section of the Act.'67 As stated above, the court cited
Hochelder to justify its position. 6 The Supreme Court in Hochfelder, however,
was not primarily concerned with remedies under the 1934 Act; rather, its pri-
mary concern was the issue of standards of liability. Thus, the Hochfelder Court
based on a defendant's bad faith is both punitive and to compensate a plaintiff for the added
expense of having to vindicate clearly established rights in court."
160 Id. at 594-95. The amount of counsel fees was $47,808.42; damages awarded the
plaintiffs totalled $38,875.00.
161 See note 67 supra.
162 See note 75 supra.
163 425 U.S. at 210. This footnote in its entirety reads:
Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage actions as significant. In
introducing Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator Fletcher indicated that the [amendment]
of § 11(e) of the 1933 Act, providing for potential payment of costs, including
attorneys' fees, "is the most important amendment of all." . . . One of its purposes
was to deter actions brought solely for their potential settlement value. . . . This
deterrent is lacking in the § 10(b) context, in which a district court's power to award
attorneys' fees is sharply circumscribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) . . . ("bad faith" requirement) [other citations omitted].
164 540 F.2d at 599.
165 Id. at 601.
166 Id. at 600.
167 Id. at 599.
168 See note 149 supra.
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required a literal reading of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act because, in the absence of
clear legislative history,' 9 a close reading was deemed necessary to proper inter-
pretation of the statute. In its limited discussion of remedies available under
§ 10(b),17 the Court emphasized that the procedural restrictions under other
sections of the 1934 Act precluded an expansion of liability under § 10(b) itself,
lest § 10(b) be used to circumvent these other sections and thus to "nullify the
effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express
actions."'171
In light of this language, the Straub court ruled that it had to apply the
1934 Act with precision, even though "the allowance of counsel fees under a
§ 10(b) proceeding is consistent with the purpose of the Act."' 72 In addition,
the court noted that the provisions of the 1934 Act that authorized the allowance
of counsel fees173 did so with "counterbalancing restrictions"' 7 and that no such
restrictive conditions had been incorporated into § 10 (b) litigation.
The Straub court, however, also failed to consider the rationale of the
Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 1 75 The complaint in Mills had
been brought under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act-a section that is completely silent
on the question of attomeys' fees. Inasmuch as §§ 9(e)"'6 and 18(a) 7 of the
Act specifically allow fee-shifting, the Supreme Court could have found that
Congress intended not to allow attorneys' fees under § 14(a). Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court chose not to interpret the congressional silence as a prohibition,
but rather as an authorization to the Court to decide the attorneys' fees issue
itself. 8 The Supreme Court found the obstacle of congressional silence no bar
to the utilization of its equity power.
Additionally, the Third Circuit in Straub failed to consider the judicially
created restrictions placed on rule 1Ob-5 litigation by the Supreme Court in
Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder.'79 By restricting recovery under rule lOb-5
to plaintiffs who have been directly harmed by proven "bad faith and vexatious
conduct" of a defendant, the Supreme Court has indeed imposed its own set of
safeguards on the rule. It is arguable that because it is limited at the outset by
these restrictions, a district court already works within the "sharply circum-
scribed"'8 0 limitations alluded to by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder and relied
upon by the Third Circuit in Straub. This interpretation is further buttressed
by the Alyeska opinion, which, in discussing the exceptions to the American Rule,
stated not that the exceptions could be utilized only upon express authorization
169 The Court found that the legislative history of the 1934 Act was "bereft of any explicit
explanation of Congress' intent." 425 U.S. at 201.
170 Id. at 206-10. This discussion of remedies must be read in the context of the Court's
basic discussion of the standard of liability.
171 Id. at 210.
172 540 F.2d at 599.
173 See notes 176-77 infra.
174 540 F.2d at 599.
175 See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
176 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970).
177 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970).
178 The Court concluded that it must determine "whether the special circumstances exist
that would justify an award of attorneys' fees." 396 U.S. at 391.
179 See text accompanying notes 76-99 supra.
180 See note 163 supra.
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of Congress, but rather that the courts could allow counsel fees "unless forbidden
by Congress."''
Thus, if the Straub court had utilized a more liberal, but not inconsistent
interpretation of the same precedents, it could have upheld the district court's
award of attorneys' fees and thus could have reached a more equitable decision-
one that would have been, by its own admission, "consistent with the purpose of
the [1934] Act."'182
C. Expansion of the Common Benefit Exception
The 1934 Act was intended to overcome the problem of fraud that can arise
from inadequate regulation of securities transactions. Because of the broad lan-
guage of rule 1Ob-5 and the congressional intent'8 that underlies the 1934 Act
from which the rule was derived, it is arguable that litigation under 10b-5 is
analogous to public interest litigation. In this regard, the "common benefit"
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mills8 4 is similar to the implicit
public benefit standard that underlies civil rights legislation. In each case a class
of potential plaintiffs is benefitted through the litigious action taken by one
member of the class. At a minimum, a successful action for fraud brought by a
plaintiff under rule 1Ob-5 conveys a benefit to the involved corporation and its
stockholders-the prevention or correction of the fraud.
For this reason the common benefit exception to the American Rule should
be expanded to allow a second rationale for a general award of attorneys' fees in
10b-5 litigation. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., which was cited with approval
by the Supreme Court in Alyeska,"'8 serves as the basis of the modern interpre-
tation of the common benefit exception. 86 The broad impact of the Mills
decision lies in its use of the term "common benefit" coupled with its adoption of
the "corporate therapeutics" principle."8 7 The decision thus confronts the prob-
lem of prohibitively high litigation costs and posits that successful litigation to
enforce the law creates a benefit to the investing public. Within this structure,
the elimination of fraudulent practices, as evidenced by "the importance of fair
and informed corporate sufferage"' 88 is the benefit rendered to "members of an
ascertainable class,"' 89 and the award of fees thus operates to "spread the costs
proportionately among them."'9 0 The letter and the spirit of this language clearly
lend themselves to equitable expansion. The authorization is already present in
the case law; the "expansion" would merely be an expansion in the frequency
with which the award is sanctioned, rather than the opening up of an entirely
new area in which awards would be permitted.
181 421 U.S. at 259.
182 See note 172 supra.
183 See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
184 See note 60 supra.
185 421 U.S. at 258.
186 See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
187 396 U.S. at 396. See note 60 supra.
188 Id.




1. The Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976
As contended above, securities fraud litigation is analogous to public interest
litigation-with the emphasis switched from public to private action. In this
regard, it is helpful briefly to examine the intent inherent in Congress's most
recent action concerning the award of attorneys' fees. Public Law 94-559,191
enacted specifically in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Alyeska Pipeline
Co. v. Wilderness Society,'9" expressly provides that "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs [of litigation under federal civil rights statutes]."''
The intent embodied in the Act is no less explicit. 4 Essentially, Congress
chose to resurrect the "private attorney general" exception to the American
Rule with regard to civil rights litigation."9 5 The rationale behind the new law
was a matter of simple legal fact: "If the cost of private enforcement actions
becomes too great, there will be no private enforcement."' 96 Furthermore, the
standard adopted by Congress to guide the courts in implementing the Act is
itself a judicial pronunciation. Congress cited Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc.'9 7 in determining that "[a] party seeking to enforce the rights protected
by the statutes covered by S. 2278, if successful, 'should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust.' "198
Congress also confronted the "penalty" rationale which had been cited in
justification of maintaining the American Rule. 9 Congress concluded that such
"private attorneys general" should not be deterred from bringing good faith
actions to vindicate their rights by the prospect of having to pay their opponent's
counsel fees should they lose, because the losing plaintiff would be assessed his
opponent's fee only if it were shown that his suit was "clearly frivolous, vexatious,
or brought for harassment purposes."2. 0 Thus, the Act deters frivolous or nui-
191 The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (1976).
192 The purpose of. the Act is to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created
by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." [1976] 5
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 5909.
193 Sec. 2. That the Revised Statutes section 722 (42 U.S.C. § 1988) is amended by
adding the following: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law
92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of
America, to enforce, or charging violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court in its
discretion may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs."
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976).
194 [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 5908-13.
195 Id. at 5910. The history reads, "Congress has commonly authorized attorneys' fees in
laws under which 'private attorneys general' play a significant role in enforcing our policies."
The history includes a list of statutes in which fee-shifting has been authorized; the list
begins with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
196 Id. at 5913.
197 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
198 [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. Nnws 5912.
199 See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
200 [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Aus. NEws 5912.
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sance suits by authorizing an award of attorneys' fees against a party shown to
have litigated in "bad faith." '' Even the amount of the award was addressed;
Congress determined that counsel for prevailing parties should be paid "for all
time reasonably expended on a matter."2 2
Admittedly, the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act applies only to cases that arise
under civil rights laws, but the rationale and arguments cited in support of the
statute are equally applicable to cases under rule 10b-5. In citing the 1934 Act
as an example of laws that authorize fee-shifting, the legislative history reads, "In
cases under these laws, fees are an integral part of the remedy necessary to achieve
compliance with our statutory policies."2' ' In both civil rights and lOb-5 liti-
gation, the motivating factor, although perhaps different in degree, is essentially
the same in kind: without an award of attorneys' fees, the cost of bringing (or
defending) an action may well be prohibitive. When the cost is prohibitive, im-
portant legal rights will not be vindicated.
Of additional importance is that Congress in the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act
not only specifically directs the courts to continue to use their traditional equity
powers in awarding attorneys' fees, but also offers guidance to the courts as to the
types of cases in which such fees should not be awarded and how the fee should
be determined. Similarly, courts in rule 10b-5 cases should, pursuant to the
exercise of this same equity power and in accordance with expanded bad faith
and common benefit exceptions to the American Rule, also award attorneys' fees
as a general rule and in accordance with the guidelines Congress has enunciated.
Without an award of fees there can be no truly effective remedy in the courts.
V. Conclusion
An examination of the history and developments of the American Rule on
attorneys' fees awards reveals an inequitable situation based on unconvincing
justifications. Whatever reasons existed for the Rule's prominence early in
American history, these reasons have now largely disappeared with the growing
complexity of litigation and the rising cost of effective legal representation.
Total repudiation of the American Rule is neither advocated nor advisable
without a thorough investigation into the ramifications of such a drastic revamp-
ing of the existing legal structure. In the interim, however, the courts, through
the exercise of their inherent equity power, possess the ability to accomplish
immediate and necessary reform in the area of rule 10b-5 litigation. Moreover,
this can be done without disrupting the present legal system.
Either by expanding the traditional bad faith exception to the American
Rule so that pre-litigation bad faith will generally suffice to invoke fee-shifting, or
by defining a party's bad faith in defending his intentionally wrongful conduct as
"litigious bad faith" capable of sustaining an award of fees, a more just result to
lOb-5 litigation will ensue. In addition, by expanding the common benefit excep-
tion to include the benefits of fraud prevention and elimination, a similar just
result will be effectuated.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 5913.
203 Id. at 5910.
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Expansion of both of these exceptions can take place in the area of 10b-5
litigation without a "drastic" departure from legal precedent. In addition, expan-
sion can take place without substantial disruption or unfairness in litigation results
because of the tight constraints placed by the Supreme Court on all litigation
under rule lOb-5. Although the net effect will be for the exceptions to swallow
the American Rule with regard to lOb-5 cases, in this area of the law the Rule
is not worth saving.
Until Congress takes the necessary step of enacting appropriate legislation
to eliminate this problem, the courts as a matter of course should, in the absence
of "special circumstances [that] would render such an award unjust," '' allow
an award of attorneys' fees to successful parties in litigation under rule lOb-5.
Donald R. Schmidt
204 See note 198 supra.
